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Abstract 
This paper asks which legal tools digital operators could use to manage colliding rights on their 
platforms in a digitalised and transnational space such as the Internet. This space can be understood as 
a “modern public square”, bringing together actions in the digitalised world and their interactions with 
actual events in the physical world. It is then useful to provide this space with a discursive framework 
allowing for discussing and contesting actions happening on it. In particular, this paper suggests that 
two well-known legal concepts, proportionality and sanctions, can be helpfully articulated within that 
discursive framework. In a first step, proportionality, a justificatory tool, is often used to suggest a way 
for managing colliding rights. This paper argues that for proportionality to be useful in managing 
colliding rights on digital platforms, its role, scope and limits need to be better framed and supplemented 
by an overall digital environment which can feed into the proportionality test in an appropriate way. 
This can be provided, thanks to a second step, namely labelling in law the actions digital operators take 
as sanctions. Sanctions are the reactions organised by digital operators to bring back social order on the 
platforms. The labelling of these reactions under the legal category of “sanctions” offers a meaningful 
tool for thinking about what digital operators do when they manage colliding rights by blocking or 
withdrawing contents and/or accounts. As different types of sanctions can be distinguished, 
differentiated legal consequences, especially in relation to managing colliding rights, can be identified. 
Here the role played by the proportionality test can be distinguished depending on the type of sanctions. 
In any case, for sanctions and proportionality to help address colliding rights on the modern public 
square, a discursive framework needs to be developed, which depends on the existence of relevant 
meaningful communities engaging in reflecting on the use of sanctions and proportionality. 
Key words 
Digital platforms, transnational normativity, pluralism, regulation, sanctions, proportionality, 
subsidiarity  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Made infamous by the El Paso shooting in the United States in the Summer 2019, 8chan was a far-right 
website which had developed its central identity around extremism. This site was “modelled on another message 
board called 4chan. But in a key difference, 4chan’s founder had the power to delete individual boards, while [8chan’s founder] 
was committed to near absolute free speech. When 4chan banned the discussion of the misogynistic harassment campaign known 
as Gamergate in 2014, 8chan gained in popularity as a staging ground for the campaign”.1 These different policies 
about acceptable behaviours on the platforms illustrate how the online world intensifies social, political or 
cultural offline claims. In the days following the shooting, 8chan was flagged up for encouraging hate 
speech. As a reaction to popular outcry against this practice, the internet infrastructure provider suspended 
its services to 8chan. Digital operators are at the interface between sources of legal and social norms shaping 
individual and collective behaviours. As a contrast to the 8chan story, Pinterest cut searches into anti-
vaccines when a measles epidemic broke out in a range of countries following a controversial anti-vaccine 
campaign.2 According to Pinterest, public health policy had to prevail over freedom of expression. This 
kind of reactions undertaken by digital operators are not neutral; they may have drastic consequences on 
social, political, cultural or economic interests of their targeted users.    
 
Platforms react to users’ behaviours using their power of coercion. They actively interfere for preventive, 
curative or punitive purposes in the interactions between users on the platforms. They limit, restrict, 
withdraw, curtail, adapt, blacklist, stop or block users’ actions for a while or definitively. They seek to 
discipline some undesirable behaviours (negative) and ensure desirable interactions on the platform 
(positive). What constitutes desirable interactions or undesirable behaviour is left to them to appreciate. In 
general, platform operators seek to foster a sense of belonging to a shared community. They will thus seek 
to foster a sense of trust among the users, especially that the platform constitutes a safe environment for 
economic transactions.3 Important values in the offline world such as truth, privacy, property or freedom 
of expression may be replicated or not so much. If reactions taken at an individual level may seem 
innocuous, akin to a traffic ticket for a minor speeding offence, they can, taken in an aggregate manner, 
direct and regulate interactions on digital platforms and their effects beyond the digital platforms in the 
offline world. The responses adopted by digital operators to undesirable behaviour in the online world are 
not merely the product of the “invisible (digital) hand”. Digital operators create a social order and seek to 
preserve its integrity, challenging the benevolent picture of social, economic and political life in the online 
world.  
 
This collective dimension of reactions taken by digital operators in the online world leads this paper to 
questioning how they operate in legal terms, especially in terms of their democratic and social values. This 
paper does not address issues pertaining to creating economic value, although these decisions may be taken 
with such purposes in mind. It asks which legal tools digital operators could use to manage colliding rights 
on their platforms in a digitalised and transnational world such as the Internet. This space can be 
understood as a “modern public square”, linking together actions in the digitalised world and their 
interactions with actual events in the physical space. It is then useful to provide this modern public square 
with a discursive framework allowing for discussing and contesting actions happening on it. In particular, 
this paper suggests that two well-known legal concepts, sanctions and proportionality, can be helpfully 
articulated within that discursive framework.  
 
First, labelling in law the actions digital operators adopt against undesirable behaviour in the modern public 
square as sanctions, ie reactions to ensure and bring back social order on digital platforms, offers a 
meaningful legal tool for thinking about what digital operators do when they manage colliding rights by 
blocking or withdrawing contents and/or accounts. As different types of sanctions can be distinguished, 
                                                        
1 J Wong, « 8chan: the far-right website linked to the rise in hate crimes » The Guardian, London, 5August 2019 
(available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/aug/04/mass-shootings-el-paso-texas-dayton-ohio-
8chan-far-right-website ). 
2 C Newton, « Pinterest’s work in public health shows the good a smaller social network can do  » The Verge, 29 August 
2019 (available at https://www.theverge.com/interface/2019/8/29/20837660/pinterest-vaccine-information-
search-results-public-health ). 
3 R Botsman, Who can you trust?: how technology brought us together–and why it could drive us apart (London: Penguin 2017). 
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differentiated legal consequences can be identified, especially in relation to managing solutions when rights 
held by different users collide with each other. In following this approach, this paper departs from current 
analyses of digital platforms, often grounded in behavioural or regulatory perspectives: nudging and 
influencing users attract most of the academic attention for their apparent novelty.4 “Soft” tools (online 
reputation system including reviews and ratings) may indeed play a specific role in policing platforms. Yet, 
sanctions as coercive responses to undesirable behaviours are very much part of the toolkit of digital 
operators. This shifts the focus to the practices of digital operators.  
 
This phenomenon is even likely to increase as users become savvier, want to do more and test platforms’ 
boundaries. This leads to sanctions appearing increasingly often on the radar. Users will see how far they 
can go. They may exit platforms when they have been punished, they may also want to stay on these 
platforms (maybe there are not that many alternatives) but seek to voice their discontent: for instance, 
through participatory structures where they may have their say about what is (or not) allowed on the digital 
platform and how behaviours should/could be monitored and policed. Sanctions would then be a catalyst 
for developing a bottom up form of organisation interested in how the collective interactions are regulated: 
here again sanctions and how they are reacted to may lead away from soft law regulation and the “invisible 
hand” approaches on digital platforms. Coordination of colliding rights may – at least partly – be analysed 
through classic legal lenses, such as sanctions, even if this concept may not encompass all actions available 
to digital operators. In using these lenses, this paper flags up how “hard law” and techniques remain relevant 
when it comes to adjudicating conflicts among users and between users and platform operators. 
 
Secondly, proportionality, a justificatory tool, is often used to suggest a way for managing collisions between 
rights. Since Lessig’s seminal work,5 the Internet governance has been analyzed through the paradigm of 
constitutional law, ie an institutional (governance) approach6 (who is competent to act? what are the 
decision-making processes?) or perspectives focused on human rights7 (what is the extent of individuals’ 
entitlement to the protection of their person or belongings?). Under a classic constitutional paradigm 
pertaining to the offline space, the proportionality test is often relied on to adjudicate interferences in the 
                                                        
4 E Carolan and A Spina, « Behavioural Sciences and EU Data Protection Law: Challenges and Opportunities » in A 
Alemanno and AL Sibony (eds), Nudge and the Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2015) 8; F Zuiderveen Borgesius, 
« Behavioural Sciences and the Regulation of Privacy on the Internet » in A Alemanno and AL Sibony (eds), Nudge 
and the Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2015); L Belli and J Venturini, « Private Ordering and the Rise of Terms of 
Service as Cyber-Regulation » (2016) 5:4 Internet Policy Review 1-17; T Büthe, « Private Regulation in the Global 
Economy: A (P)Review » (2010) 12:3 Business and Politics 1-38; D Baron, « Private Ordering on the Internet: The Ebay 
Community of Traders » (2002) 4:3 Business and Politics 245-74. 
5 L Lessig, Code 2.0. (Basic Books 2006). 
6 See eg C Petersen, V Ulfbeck and O Hansen, « Platforms as Private Governance Systems - the Example of Airbnb 
» (2018) Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 38-61; M Finck, « Digital Co-Regulation: Designing a Supranational Legal 
Framework for the Platform Economy” (2018) 43 European Law Review 47-68; B Cannon and H Chung, « A 
Framework for Designing Co-Regulation Models Well-Adapted to Technology-Facilitated Sharing Economies » 
(2015) 31 Santa Clara Computer and High Technology LJ 23-96; C Reed, Making Laws for Cyberspace (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2012); D Koukiadis, Reconstituting Internet Normativity. The Role of State, Private Actors, Global Online 
Community in the Production of Legal Norms (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2015); C Marsden, Internet Co-Regulation: European 
Law, Regulatory Governance and Legitimacy in Cyberspace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011). 
7 See eg C de Terwangne and Q Van Enis, L'Europe des droits de l'homme à l'heure d'Internet (Brussels: Bruylant 2019) ; 
J  Venturini, L Louzada, M Maciel, N Zingales, K Stylianou, and L Belli, Terms of Service and Human Rights: An Analysis 
of Online Platform Contracts (Editora Revan, Rio de Janeiro 2016); S  Hick, E. Halpin and E. Hoskins, Human Rights and 
the Internet (Palgrave Macmillan UK 2016); R Fisman, and L Michael, Fixing Discrimination in Online Marketplaces, HBR, 
no. December 2016; C Geiger, and E Izyumenko, « The Role of Human Rights in Copyright Enforcement Online: 
Elaborating a Legal Framework for Website Blocking » (2016) 32:1 Am U Int'l L R 43; A Savin, EU Internet Law 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2013); J Glaser, and K B Kahn, « Prejudice and Discrimination and the Internet » in Y 
Amichai-Hamburger (ed), The Social Net. Human Behavior in Cyberspace (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005) 247-274. 
For an analysis under Intellectual Property perspective, N Tusikov, Chokepoints: Global Private Regulation on the Internet 
(Univ of California Press 2016). For an early analysis under freedom of expression, M Siegel, « Hate Speech, Civil 
Rights, and the Internet: The Jurisdictional and Human Rights Nightmare Comment » (1998-99) 2 Albany Law Journal 
of Science & Technology 375-98. For an analysis under non-discrimination, see A Chander, « The Racist Algorithm? » 
(2017) 115:6 Mich L Rev 1023-45. With regards to online access to justice, E Katsh and O Rabinovich-Einy, Digital 
Justice: Technology and the Internet of Disputes (New York: Oxford University Press 2017).  
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rights held by citizens. This paper argues that a transposition of the proportionality test from this usual 
offline setting to the online world may provide for answers when digital operators are confronted with 
colliding rights held by platform users or when they wonder whether they should or could interfere with 
the rights of users. Yet, for this transposition to provide a meaningful solution, the role, scope and limits 
of the proportionality test need to be better framed and supplemented by an overall digital environment 
feeding the proportionality test in an appropriate way.  
This paper is structured as follows. It first locates sanctions within the conceptual framework of 
transnational hybrid governance and especially within the “modern public square” (Section 2), before 
revisiting proportionality, a traditional principle underpinning the balancing of rights and freedoms and the 
imposition of sanctions (Section 3). It then looks at the practical application of the proportionality test that 
digital operators need to consider when enforcing sanctions on their platforms (Section 4). In order to go 
beyond the limits of the proportionality test, this paper then suggests two avenues – one institutional and 
one community-based to address gaps in the discussions triggered by relying on the proportionality test to 
address colliding rights on the modern public square (Section 5). Section 6 concludes on further research 
avenues. 
2. FRAMING COORDINATION OF DIFFERENCES IN THE ONLINE WORLD 
To analyse the tools available to digital operators faced with colliding rights of users in the offline world, 
we need to proceed in two steps: first, one needs to understand what the digital space is in terms of 
interactions, ie a modern public square with gate-keepers and umpires, the digital operators, entrusted with 
specific “warden” functions (2.1); secondly, if we see the digital world as an extension of the offline space, 
under the form of a modern public square, one needs to consider how the law would label digital operators’ 
interferences with colliding rights if we were in offline space, in particular one needs to examine if these 
interferences may be called “sanctions”. One may then test whether it is possible to extent this label of 
“sanctions” to the reactions taken by digital operators to coordinate colliding rights in the online world, 
with all the legal consequences attached to this label (2.2). 
2.1 The modern public square: different voices in a transnational space 
Platform operators illustrate perfectly transnational hybrids: they operate across many jurisdictions, 
providing services in many countries, with key nodes located in strategically chosen countries in order to 
enjoy favourable legal rules pertaining to contracts, data, taxation, intellectual property for examples. The 
platform users are only vaguely aware that Uber processes worldwide payments to drivers (except in the 
US) through a Dutch company resident of the Bahamas. Similarly, Amazon.co.uk has no permanent 
establishment in the United Kingdom: it is incorporated in Luxembourg. These average same users are 
even less aware of the technological infrastructure leading some digital platforms to file taxes for their users 
in Ecuador or in Estonia when a contract is concluded. These features are key economic components in 
digital platforms however. Digital platforms play multiple roles however: they enable economic transactions 
between peers and are also vehicles for social and political interactions or behaviour. They do not only 
facilitate communication and exchanges; they also control communication between the parties to a 
transaction and facilitate payment, and thus extract a commission or a fee as a price for their 
intermediation.8  
This specific situation entails three main features for digital platforms; they are digitalised, transnational and 
pluralist. First, digital platforms are digitalised, ie an extension of the offline space into the online world. 
Hence actions taken by digital platforms may cause significant harm to individuals in the offline space. For 
instance, when a social media influencer’s account or an Uber driver is deactivated, it limits their freedom 
of expression, but it also prevents them from conducting their professional activity. In the same vein, when 
Uber deactivates one of its riders’ account because of her misconduct, it impacts on her mobility. These 
offline consequences need to be included in any assessment of the online space. Secondly, digital platforms 
                                                        
8 D McKee, « The platform economy: natural, neutral, consensual and efficient? » (2017) 8:4 Transnational Legal Theory 
pp. 455-495.  
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are transnational, ie technological structure facilitating social and economic activity across people and borders 
or regardless of borders. Thirdly, they are pluralist,9 in the sense that users come with different expectations 
and values when they operate on the digital platforms, some visible to the other users, some not so visible. 
In particular, digital users harbour different expectations, attitudes and understanding of how to behave. 
This is not only due to their different cultural and spatial attachments. This is also due to the changed 
visibility of their actions. Their visibility is increased as the Internet helps reach and put in contact users in 
an extensive way. Visibility is also modified because when posting or acting on digital platforms, the users 
may not know to which audience they will become visible (in time and space). 
This paper considers that the conjoined effect of these three features of digital platforms lead to the 
development of a specific space of political, social, economic and technological interactions, a space best 
encapsulated under the expression of a “modern public square”.10 This expression reflects that digital 
platforms constitute an environment where goods, services and data are purchased or exchanged as well as 
news, opinions, ideas or creative expressions through digital interactions among people from potentially 
widely different backgrounds and who potentially know each other very well or not at all, who may repeat 
their interactions in the long term or never again. Relationships and exchanges between users on the 
modern public square may be conducted with very different strategies in mind. The modern public square 
cannot expect these relationships and exchanges to be harmonious by themselves. Collisions between rights 
held by users happen.11 Doubts arise about their legal solutions. For instance, what is legally, politically or 
morally acceptable somewhere may not be elsewhere. Identifying where to look for a legal solution may 
not be an easy task. Overall, the modern public square has to rely on a certain level of organisation,12 to 
ensure the coordination of exchanges and relationships. 
Digital platforms challenge the classical relationships between power, law and territory as developed in 
classic international public law. They are part of global cross-border phenomena, with colliding public and 
private bodies claiming authority to organise social relationships and economic exchanges. States adopt 
laws applying to the whole of society while functional actors such as digital platforms are hyper-specialised 
(technically and functionally); they accumulate technical and social capital in a limited range of issues. 
However digital platforms combine extensive powers in their hands (through the combination of hard law 
and self-regulatory techniques such as the setting of terms of services): in a way, they concentrate quasi-
normative, quasi-executive and quasi-judicial powers because they both create the applications, networks 
and things under their control and regulate their functioning.13 
This leads to two questions when comparing the modern public square and the offline space of economic 
and political actions. One question pertains to the overall organisation of this modern public square in 
general. To answer this question one may venture to say that this modern public square is not a mere virtual 
construction with no supporting structure, underpinning organisation and normativity. This paper suggests 
that this modern public square, as a concept spanning the online and offline space, needs to be equipped 
with the necessary systems, institutions and procedures allowing for identifying problematic behaviour 
threatening its (economic, social or political) integrity and for providing for argumentation and discussion 
to happen in response to users’ behaviour. There should be an accepted reflexive framework for calling 
actors to accountability, giving them an opportunity to make their case, to be listened to and properly 
                                                        
9 Cfr M Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism – A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Transnational Legal World (Oxford: 
Hart 2009). 
10 This notion refers here to these three main features, although there may be other relevant features connected with 
this notion. These three main features are relevant for analysing sanctions and proportionality as explored within the 
limits of this paper.  
11 D Harvey, Collisions in the Digital Paradigm: Law and Rule Making in the Internet Age (Oxford/Portland: Bloomsbury 
Publishing 2017). 
12 McKee (above (8)) explains how the “market” is not natural but has required historically structures to ensure that 
free exchange happens. 
13 L Belli and C Sappa, « The Intermediary Conundrum: Cyber-Regulators, Cyber-Police or Both? » (2017) 8 JIPITEC 
183 para 7-8; E Marique and Y Marique, « Sanctions on digital platforms – beyond the public/private divide » (2019) 
8:2 Cambridge Journal of International Law (forthcoming). 
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replied to.14 This type of framework would thus be a way to incentivise functional actors, such as digital 
platforms, to factor in the potential externalities of their decisions in their decision-making processes.15  
Another question pertains to the role (powers and duties) that digital operators play on this modern public 
square. Due to the specific positions of digital operators on the modern public square as regulator and 
controller, this question asks whether digital platforms do have specific duties with regards to its functioning 
and in particular identifying and addressing problematic behaviour on the modern public square. In the 
online world, digital platforms are entities entrusted with functions akin to administrative policing, which 
puts them in charge of securing the general preservation of public order and morality.16 There is a need for 
systems to guarantee the respect of the established rules, and prevent undue inconvenience for the integrity 
of life in the community. In the offline space, entities entrusted with such functions may be public or private 
actors, which may lead to distinction between their priorities in discharging their functions.17 An increasing 
amount of empirical and socio-legal research shows that public law requirements, controls and 
accountability mechanisms are currently extended to private actors.18 It is suggested here that digital 
operators have a duty to take the appropriate measures to ensure the integrity of users’ interactions on the 
modern public square, subject to suitable accountability mechanisms. This duty has been connected to their 
role of gate-keeper of the platform19 or cyber-police.20 It will be referred to here as their “warden” function, 
because digital operators can exclude users from the modern public square as much as they can take a range 
of measures in relation to behaviours threatening the integrity of the modern public square. We turn to 
labelling these measures in the following lines. 
2.2 Digital operators’ (re)actions in case of colliding rights: sanctions  
What constitutes sanctions has been discussed for centuries. Orbediek provides a good analytical starting 
point. For him, “a sanction, […] is any threatened, promised, instituted or declared response on behalf of a group or 
institution attached to the breach or neglect of a recognized norm, policy, order, law or command done with the implicit or 
explicit intent of discouraging or preventing any such breach or neglect.”21 Sanctions bear interconnected features. 
Sanctions are such a response, relying on the exercise of power and taken by digital operators towards 
undesirable behaviour on the modern public square. Sanctions react to a specific problematic situation or 
behavior defined as such by a socially recognized rule.22 Therefore, unintended actions of the platform 
                                                        
14 P Kjaer, « Why justification? The structure of public power in transnational contexts » (2017) (8:1) Transnational 
Legal Theory 8-21. 
15 G Vilaca, « Transnational legal normativity » in M Sellers and S Kirste (eds), Encyclopedia of the philosophy of law and 
social policy (Springer 2017) 
16 L Belli and C Sappa, « The Intermediary Conundrum: Cyber-Regulators, Cyber-Police or Both? » (2017) 8 JIPITEC 
183 para 18. 
17 In particular, private entities may seek profit maximisation over general well-being (cfr recurring issues in contracting 
out of public services in Europe). L Belli and C Sappa, « The Intermediary Conundrum: Cyber-Regulators, Cyber-
Police or Both? » (2017) 8 JIPITEC 183 para 19. 
18 A Benish and J Pelisse, « Private companies and administrative justice » in M Hertogh, R Kirkham, R Thomas and 
J Tomlinson (eds), Oxford Handbook of Administrative Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press forthcoming); J Bell, 
« Judicial Review in the Administrative State » in J de Poorter, E Hirsch Ballin and S Lavrijssen (eds), Judicial Review of 
Administrative Discretion in the Administrative State (Springer 2019) 3-26; J Freeman, « Extending public law norms through 
privatization » (2003) 116:5 Harvard Law Review 1285-1352. 
19 M Cian, “Online Platforms as Gatekeepers to the Digital World – a Preliminary Issue on Business Freedom, 
Competition and the Need for a Special Market Regulation” (2018) Journal of European Consumer and Market Law 209-
10; R Van Loo, “Rise of the Digital Regulator” (2017) Duke Law Journal 1317. 
20 L Belli and C Sappa, « The Intermediary Conundrum: Cyber-Regulators, Cyber-Police or Both? » (2017) 8 JIPITEC 
183. 
21 H Oberdiek, « The Role of Sanctions and Coercion in Understanding Law and Legal Systems » (1976) 21:1 The 
American Journal of Jurisprudence 71-94 at 75. 
22 Such social recognition can be problematic on digital platforms when it comes to users “accepting terms of services” 
without reading the fine prints. While platform operators take a formal stance on what constitutes a “recognized rule”, 
they will face the criticism of consumers’ associations that users are not aware of the substance of the rule. These 
associations would thus challenge that platform “can even take such measures”. However, the formal approach chosen 
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operators, such as accidental exclusions by the algorithm (eg repeated error messages, non-technical 
recognition of information not included in the system) do not count as sanctions in this respect. This 
reactive nature of the sanction is important: they constitute a consequence of a behaviour rather than a 
condition for action. They can be automatized, or not, as a consequence of the behaviour, but cannot be 
considered a priori, without preliminary users’ actions or problematic behaviour. 
Although their functions can be discussed, sanctions usually have two main purposes, one negative and one 
positive. On the negative side, sanctions aim to ban a behavior or an action arising from social relationships 
and economic exchange. They aim to discourage users from adopting certain problematic behaviors, such 
as preventing illegal contents and harassment. On a more constructive side, sanctions can be retributive 
(where the individual needs to “pay back” to the community for the infringement), reparative (where the 
individual is isolated to place the community back in a state of peace as if the violation had never taken 
place),23 or pedagogic (when they help users to identify, learn and transmit the core values the platform 
wishes to promote).24 For practitioners (and academics), sanctions can thus express how amount digital 
operators defend certain values over others and counterbalance the marketing narratives with their actual 
practices. Such approach is indeed defended (with more or less success) by labor lawyers trying to 
characterize the sanctioning power of Uber and Deliveroo as a supervision and control mechanism giving 
rise to an employment relationship rather than an independent “partnership” agreement.25 Conversely, 
failure to act against certain behaviors, despite recognizing them as unwanted in terms of services or 
marketing practices, amount to a policy choice that the underpinning value is not worth enough fighting 
for.  
In the offline world, these actions would fall within the definition of “sanctions”, with all the legal 
consequences attached to that legal qualification, including the availability of a judicial or independent 
review mechanism.26 Principles of review need thus to be established on the modern public square. This 
paper proposes to examine the principle of proportionality under these new lenses.   
3. A TEST FOR ELUCIDATING THE HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT IN A MODERN PUBLIC SQUARE  
 
Once the reactions from digital operators are labelled as a known legal category, that of sanctions, the legal 
consequences usually attached to this legal category can be investigated further.27 Here the requirement of 
proportionality takes a special role for its principled use in the case of colliding rights (3.1) and for the 
modalities that have been suggested for this test in the digital space (3.2). 
 
3.1 Proportionality in principle  
Faced with colliding rights on the online world, such as freedom of expression vs the right to privacy or 
freedom of expression vs public health policies,28 platforms have a range of possible options: from doing 
nothing and letting users act as they wish to giving priority to specific rights or specifying a clear hierarchy 
between the rights at stake for instance. There is a preliminary question here: should digital operators 
interfere with users’ interactions at all? It may be argued that any interferences with users’ activities on the 
                                                        
by the platform enable lawyers, litigators and practitioners to characterize platform behaviors as sanctions and 
therefore to find the need for adequate protection as sanction. 
23 Eg M van de Kerchove, « Les fonctions de la sanction pénale. Entre droit et philosophie » (2005) 127:7 Informations 
sociales 22-31, 27-30.  
24 For such an interpretation of Durkheim, see J Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press 
1970) 102.  
25 C Wattecamps, A-G Kleczewski and E Marique, « Challenges related to law for the platform economy: A fresh look 
at some important dichotomies » (2017/3) Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique 57-95, 66-71. 
26 Following that line of reasoning, see eg SL Kalėda, « The Role of the Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in 
Relation to Website Blocking Injunctions » (2017) 8 JIPITEC 216 para 35.  
27 Other legal aspects than proportionality, such as legality or procedural guarantees, are not investigated within the 
limited remit of this paper. 
28 See Introduction the examples of 8chan and Pinterest. 
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digital platforms would be akin to censorship.29 However, it may be advanced that the general interest of 
the “modern public square” requires that at least some level of policing and monitoring of users’ activities 
on the platforms is organised. This allows to maintain a good environment for social interactions and 
exchanges on the digital platforms. The question shifts then from the principle of interference on the 
modern public square to the modalities of this interference, and especially how digital operators collect the 
information needed to carry out their minimal desirable monitoring, process it, organise their decision-
making on their basis and implement it in practice. If one accepts this position, the proportionality test may 
be a tool to ensure that digital operators follow a reasoning process that can be called for account.  
The proportionality test of public action is widely accepted as a way for controlling public power30 and 
sanctions31.32 This test may be used at different stages of the sanctioning process, ie when setting the 
normative framework, monitoring compliance, imposing sanctions, implementing them and/or 
adjudicating between colliding rights in specific or general circumstances; or when reviewing them. 
Normally, the proportionality test implies that decision-makers should only follow a course of action if 1) 
their objective is legitimate; 2) their means is necessary to achieve their objective; 3) no means would entail 
a lighter encroachment of the right at stake; 4) the means is proportional (sensu stricto) to the objective to be 
achieved. The conceptual foundations and modalities for this test are endlessly discussed.33  
 
Proportionality has been much criticized for its apparent neutrality. It would allow judges to review 
administrative actions without imposing their own values and priorities about which course of action is 
preferable in a specific case. However value judgements may be hidden at each stage of the reasoning 
process,34 at the levels of both administrative and judicial decision-making. This challenges the uniform 
application and the predictability of the proportionality test. Yet, it is often said that the proportionality test 
provides a tool for requiring decision-makers to explain their reasoning process. In so doing, the 
proportionality test helps foster a culture of justification and persuasion.35 In order to allay these criticisms, 
Alexy suggested an abstract “weight formula” assessing the interferences in the rights at stake in a more 
objective way.36 In a modern public square, an additional challenge arises, that of identifying the main actors 
of this culture of justification and persuasion.  
 
                                                        
29 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, 16 May 2011, Human Rights Council, 17th session, para 40-43. 
30 For an attempt to reconcile the American and the European approaches to balancing rights: K-H Ladeur, « A 
critique of balancing and the principle of proportionality in constitutional law – a case for ‘impersonal rights’? » (2016) 
7:2 Transnational legal theory 228-256. 
31 Eg for administrative sanctions: C.E. fr., 19 mai 1933, Benjamin. A comment is available on the French Conseil 
d’Etat’s website: http://www.conseil-etat.fr/Decisions-Avis-Publications/Decisions/Les-decisions-les-plus-
importantes-du-Conseil-d-Etat/19-mai-1933-Benjamin.; for discussions in relation to criminal sanctions: eg A von 
Hirsch, « Proportionality in the philosophy of punishment » (1992) 16 Crime and Justice 55-98; J Deigh, « Punishment 
and proportionality » (2014) 33:3 Criminal Justice Ethics 185-199; J Deigh, « Punishment and proportionality: Part 2 » 
(2016) 35:1 Criminal Justice Ethics 21-38. 
32 A Stone Sweet and J Mathews, « Proportionality balancing and global constitutionalism » (2008) 47 Colum J Transnat’l 
L 72-164. 
33 Eg: F Urbina, « Is it really that easy – A critique of proportionality and “balancing” as reasoning » (2014) 27:1 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 167-192; M Klatt and M Meister, « Proportionality – A benefit to human rights 
– Remarks on the I-Con controversy » (2012) 10 Int’l J Const L 687-708. 
34 Eg: S Greer, « ‘Balancing’ and the European Court of Human Rights: A Contribution to the Habermas-Alexy 
Debate » (2004) 63:2 Cambridge Law Journal 412-434. 
35 D Dyzenhaus, « Proportionality and deference in a culture of justification » in G Huscroft, B Miller and G Weber 
(eds), Proportionality and the rule of law – Rights, Justification, Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014) 234-
258. 
36 R Alexy, « The construction of constitutional rights » (2012) 91:3 Revue française de droit constitutionnel 465-477; R 
Alexy, « Proportionality, constitutional law, and sub-constitutional law: A reply to Aharon Barak » (2018) 16:3 I•CON 
871–879. 
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3.2 A specific proportionality test for the digital space: The internet balancing formula37  
 
In the context of colliding rights in the online world, Susi builds on Alexy’s weight formula to devise in 
concrete and practical terms a test that platform operators could use when making decisions pertaining to 
response to problematic behaviors and interactions happening on their platforms. While Alexy’s balancing 
formula is expressed at a high level of abstraction to balance the intensity of interferences between human 
rights,38 Susi gives an operational and concrete translation of the formula in the case of conflicts between 
the right to privacy and freedom of expression. His approach is best summarized as follows.  
 
The first step of the reasoning is to exclude any balancing in case of hate speech, as hate speech should 
always be banned from digital platforms. The second step is to calculate the “value” of the right to privacy, 
which is the addition of the following factors: the vulnerability of the individual due to internet technologies, 
the interference in privacy (calculated in taking the perspective from an neutral onlooker), and the element 
of time with time passing being assumed to be a decreasing factor in terms of interference.39 The third step 
in the reasoning pertains to the calculation of the numerical value of the freedom of expression. This is 
based on the addition of three elements:  
1) the level of public interest in the matter (ie: minor public interest is public interest measured in 
terms of the local community affected by the matter; medium public interest refers to cases when 
the larger community is affected but with no immediate direct impact on the lives of the majority; 
and significant public interest to cases when matters affect the entire nation or have a direct effect 
upon the lives of the majority);  
2) the determination as to whether the information concerns a public figure;  
3) the ways in which information has been obtained (either legally or not, either morally or not).40  
 
In addition, on each side of the formula, a further factor needs to be added, which Susi calls “empathy”. 
The exact meaning of this concept is not clear, but its function is to ensure that human agency has to 
intervene in some cases at least, namely when there is a break even between the two sides of the equation 
and when moral reasons command it.41 Finally, Susi reserves a specific treatment to cases where divulgation 
of the information trumps privacy due to its contribution to historical truth.42 
 
Susi stresses that this formula should give a rational answer to cases where the right to privacy and the 
freedom of expression collide, a formula that would allow anybody, the “citizen journalist” included, to 
decide if an information should or could be published on a digital platform.43 Anyone – even without legal 
training – would be able to use it.44 This would thus prevent abuse and censorship from digital platforms 
in refusing to publish online information.45 A higher degree of transparency would indeed be gained. The 
formula would provide standards to carry out the assessment and the argumentation behind the decision. 
 
4. OPERATIONALIZING PROPORTIONALITY IN CASE OF “SANCTIONS”: TESTING LIMITS    
 
In developing their platform architecture, policies and implementation tools, digital operators make a range 
of choices pertaining to the best strategy to address colliding rights on an on-going basis. In their search 
for finding a technique that could be accommodated with their technologies, they might be interested to 
                                                        
37 M Susi, « The Internet balancing formula » (2019) 25 European Law Journal 198-212. 
38 R Alexy, « Mart Susi’s internet balancing formula » (2019) 25 European Law Journal 213-220. 
39 Susi above (37) 205. 
40 Susi above (37) 205-207. 
41 Susi above (37) 207. 
42 Susi above (37) 208. 
43 Susi above (37) 199.  
44 Susi above (37) 204. 
45 This discussion becomes especially relevant when examining the current European Union reforms on copyright in 
the Digital Single Market (Directive (EU) 2019/790). This reform might indeed change the current scope of online 
freedom of speech and other human rights. It will also shift the liability standards for digital operators’ actions and 
thus alter their willingness to commit money in compliance costs. This directive is an opportunity for digital operators 
to improve their review procedures in order to limit their exposure to liability in the face of undue removal of content.  
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turn to the internet balancing formula. If this approach may be a positive addition in their toolkit, there are 
however areas where caution is required (4.1). Finding means for supplementing the internet balancing 
formula might be a way forward. Here a more nuanced understanding of the reactions taken by digital 
operators is offered to distinguish cases where a proportionality test may be used from cases where this 
may be less the case (4.2). 
 
4.1 Potential and challenges to the internet balancing formula    
Susi’s formula translates the proportionality test into a duty for digital platforms to ensure that their 
reactions are tailored to each of their users, according to the (relevant) data available to the platform in 
question following a balancing test between the right to privacy and freedom of expression.46 As this 
approach is appealing to regulate users’ behaviours on platforms, it deserves further attention. Its 
operationalisation faces challenges even if taken on its own terms. As Susi calls for further empirical and 
philosophical discussions, this paper asserts that a strength of the internet balancing formula is to launch 
an argumentative and discursive process on the balancing of colliding rights on the modern public square 
by private actors such as digital platforms. One key issue is however who will be active contributors to this 
process. Although Susi invites “citizens journalists” and lay people to use the formula and fine-tune it, such 
a formula is more likely to offer a reflexive framework and argumentative scheme for the use of an epistemic 
community, made up of digital operators in the first place, some key users, and maybe some social groups 
especially equipped for this role:47 using the formula will indeed require a range of data and skills (including 
investigation and research skills), especially as some of this data will not be available online. Indeed, if we 
accept the interactions between the online and the offline worlds, some of the interferences will take place 
in the offline world, and it is not clear how the information about it will be captured by the Internet (more 
importantly even, whether it should be captured by the internet in the first place). In addition, using the 
formula will require a good knowledge of the law and the case law across various jurisdictions, a good grasp 
of the empirical reality48 and access to a range of statistical tools about the ways in which platforms operate 
(their market, audience, countries of operations, specific groups or objectives). Here a technical support 
will be needed for fostering the concrete use of the formula.  
In addition to questions related to the intended users of the internet balancing formula, one may argue 
whether human rights are ever quantifiable as a matter of principle or about the nitty-gritty aspects of the 
formula,49 but suffice here to mention four general challenges for operationalizing the formula: values; 
human factors; individual dimension and argumentative space for using the formula. In a way all these 
challenges turn around one key question: the neutrality of the judgement exercised by the entity operating 
the formula. This neutrality is not guaranteed. The formula rests on a series of normative choices which 
could be contested or further argued about in order to test it.  
Firstly, the internet balancing formula has two major limits factored into it: first, hate speech is always 
banned, so that the formula does not apply when hate speech has been identified; secondly, historical truth 
can never be suppressed, so that the formula is not relevant either in that case. If one can fully agree with 
these two limits, they are more complicated in practice. Does hate speech have a universal definition? What 
is historical truth and how is it supposed to be ascertained? What if different groups have different claims 
about what constitutes historical truth? Is it really the function of digital operators to adjudicate this? In 
addition, these two limits assume minimal values that cannot be undermined by digital platforms on the 
modern public square. This leads to questioning whether these values are the only relevant ones or whether 
                                                        
46 On the individual tailoring of decisions by algorithms, see for instance E Marique and A Strowel, « Gouverner par 
la loi ou les algorithmes: de la norme générale de comportement au guidage rapproché des conduites » (2017) 10 Dalloz 
IP/IT 517-521. 
47 See below Section 5.2. 
48 Susi mentions the need to base the formula on empirical experience, but the methods, project designs and the ways 
in which the findings would feed the formula are not explained (Susi above (37) 204). 
49 Professor Alexy flagged up some problems in his answer (R Alexy, « Mart Susi’s internet balancing formula » (2019) 
25 European Law Journal 213-220). 
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other values need to be included in a form of minimal core, a kind of “rule of law” for ensuring the integrity 
of the modern public square, and how they could be identified.   
Secondly, the internet balancing formula seeks to recognise the human dimension of the modern public 
square, through the factors of empathy and internet vulnerability. This approach may be a way to address 
a subjective assessment of colliding rights by digital operators. There are problems here. In practice, it is 
difficult to justify why internet vulnerability is given a constant value of “1” in the formula and why empathy 
is given the same value in the two sides of the formula. On the one hand, the constant value “1” allocated 
to internet vulnerability in the formula gives more weight to the right to privacy compared to freedom of 
expression while different users or individuals may be more or less vulnerable to such exposure.50 On the 
other hand, empathy is supposed to be used in the formula when moral grounds justify it. Yet, managing 
colliding rights will nearly always have a moral dimension of some kind, which renders unclear whether it 
is supposed to be included across the board or in borderline cases that remain to be identified. 
Thirdly, the internet balancing formula is geared to address conflicts between the right to privacy and 
freedom of expression, and their individual variations. Yet, other rights – including collective rights and 
freedoms – may also have to be included in any balancing exercise as well as the longer and shorter terms 
effects of these balancing exercises.51 It is not clear how the internet balancing formula can be expanded to 
take these aspects into account. 
Finally, that the internet balancing formula contributes to confidence and transparency on the modern 
public square platforms needs to be acknowledged as important. Two points can be made here. The first 
one relates to the discursive and argumentative framework within which proportionality is used by judges 
for adjudicating offline colliding rights. Judges are acting within specific argumentative constraints: they 
need to convince a range of players that their decisions are the right ones. These constraints may work in 
different ways depending on the judiciaries, but they usually have two key features. Firstly, judges usually 
work within tight procedural constraints where both parties have the opportunity to make their case, to be 
heard, to be listened to and to be responded to, which are important components for recognising the human 
dignity of the players and to respect them.52 Secondly, judges normally work within a constitutional context 
where the legislature can react to judicial decisions if they disagree with them. This step may or may not be 
activated, or only activated in marginal cases, but it does exist. This has two key consequences. The first 
consequence is that judges often act incrementally, often steeped in pragmatism.53 The second consequence 
is that judges work within a community of legal professionals, dialoging, resisting and communicating with 
them. These key features of the discursive and argumentative framework underpinning the use of 
proportionality in offline conflicts of rights are not guaranteed in the case of the internet balancing formula. 
At least Susi does not suggest ways in which they would be replicated. One may be forgiven to think that 
the formula is meant to be included in an algorithm of some kind and that contestations and challenges 
may arise, although Susi does not spell out the grounds, space, processes or institutions which would host 
these challenges. It is thus not clear whether digital platforms think of themselves as being held to convince 
peers and institutional actors (regulators? investors? stakeholders?) and according to which criteria 
(economic performance? corporate social responsibility in some form? something else?).  
 
Overall, the modern public square does not include an institutional or procedural framework similar to 
what exists in the offline world for judges. In particular, the modern public square – with its key features 
of being digitalized, transnational and pluralistic – comes with a highly disaggregated audience. If and when 
digital operators want to rely on a proportionality test such as the internet balancing formula (or a possible 
variation thereof) to exercise their warden functions, the proportionality test may be used as a focal point 
of attention, drawing the interests of users likely to be affected by its use, but the whole modern public 
square will need to be equipped with further structures, institutions and processes so as to ensure that the 
                                                        
50 Alexy above (36) 216-17. 
51 We cannot agree with the assumption made by Prof. Susi that the passing of time always decreases the interferences 
with rights. 
52 J Waldron, « The rule of law and the importance of procedure » (2011) 50 Nomos, Getting to the rule of law, 3-31. 
53 We leave aside here the discussions about judicial activism and “gouvernement des juges”, although this very discussion 
illustrates that judges need to be persuasive in their judgments. 
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components of the formula, its outcomes and modalities are effectively subject to scrutiny, discussions and 
accountability. In this developmental process, it may be important to fine-tune the cases where a 
proportionality test carried out by digital operators may be relevant. At an abstract general, a proportionality 
test can happen at four stages or moments: when a norm identifying a problematic behaviour is set (with 
the principle and its consequences), when a decision is taken in relation to a concrete problematic 
behaviour, when the specific reaction to this concrete problematic behaviour is chosen, and when an 
independent review is carried out into this reaction. Here, distinguishing between types of reactions by 
digital operators about colliding rights can be made can help better understand when digital operators may 
carry out a proportionality test for ensuring the integrity on the modern public square. A typology of these 
reactions is offered in the next sub-section.  
 
4.2 Typology of sanctions in the modern public square 
In the online world, digital platforms sanctioning processes can be broken down into four main types: 1) 
platforms acting on behalf of public bodies to sanction illegal behaviors (under EU/international or 
domestic law); 2) platforms using a discretionary power to implement policies or legal obligations adopted 
by public bodies; 3) platform operators imposing sanctions for behaviors they have identified themselves 
as undesirable; and 4) sanctions imposed following a quasi-judicial process organized by platforms to 
adjudicate between users. 
In the first category of sanctions, operators may have to take action to take down content on the platforms, 
so as to avoid becoming liable themselves for hosting or curating illegal content. Good illustrations of this 
can be found in the secondary liability system protecting intellectual property rights54 or in the famous 
Yahoo! case, where Yahoo! had to restrict access to French users on the part of its platform where nazi 
memorabilia were put to auction, so as to comply with French law.55  In this case, platforms seem to act as 
delegatees or arms of the state and public bodies: they are in a position to take the necessary actions to 
ensure that legal obligations or interdictions are complied with. Here a private actor (the operator) extends 
the reach of public bodies onto the platforms. The private assists and enhances/strengthens the capability 
(action) of public bodies at a practical/material level.  
In this first case, a statute clearly puts an obligation or a duty on digital operators56 or a judgment enjoins 
them to comply with the law.57 In such scenario where a legal duty to act (by statute or by court order) is 
clearly established, the platform operator does not have to make any proportionality assessment with 
regards to the principle of an interference in users’ rights nor in its application. It merely has to assess 
whether the response triggered by the violation is proportionate to the infringement (to the extent that the 
expected response is not dictated by statute or court decisions). For instance, hate speech (or conversely, 
historic truth) is ipso facto outside of the scope of the Susi’s formula. In such a scenario, states take the 
principled decision to forbid (or conversely, authorize) the publication of such content. Here, states assess 
the proportionality, not the digital operators who have no scope left to exercise a proportionality test. 
In the second category of sanctions (“co-regulation”), the digital operator acts on behalf of public bodies 
but the exact link and its legal nature can be difficult to pin down. The digital operator may seem in a 
position where it can easily implement legal obligations and enforce them on the platforms. Yet, in practice, 
legal obligations do not get implemented in a void, through a magic wand or in a mechanical fashion. Some 
norms provide a large leeway for the operators to decide whether to respond or not to the violation of 
some legal duties and the extent of this violation. Digital operators have to develop processes and 
techniques to detect infringements and to decide what to do with them. For instance, Facebook hired teams 
of content moderators/reviewers in Germany to ensure that users acting on its platform comply with the 
                                                        
54 R Drath, « Hotfile, Megaupload, and the Future of Copyright on the Internet: What Can Cyberlockers Tell Us 
About DMCA Reform » (2012) 12 J Marshall Rev Intell Prop L 205. 
55 Paris Trial court, Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme v Yahoo!, 20 November 2000; Yahoo! Inc., v La Ligue Contre Le 
Racisme et l’Antisémitisme, 379 F 3d 1120 (9th Ct, 23 August 2004).  
56 See for instance J Riordan, The Liability of Internet Intermediaries (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016) 114–16 
57 Paris Trial court, Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme v Yahoo!, 20 November 2000; Yahoo! Inc., v La Ligue Contre Le 
Racisme et l’Antisémitisme, 379 F 3d 1120 (9th Ct, 23 August 2004). 
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German Network Enforcement Law and German criminal law. But this team has several options in front 
of them when examining content. Removal of certain sets of content uploaded is not the only possible 
response. Other solutions are available for platforms, such as retrograding the rank of content, making 
warnings or disclaimers about the content (as for website allowing classified ads for escort services or 
pornographic video sharing) or restricting comments (as online news website aware that some comments 
might go quickly off-topic because of political sensitivity). The platform, as an actor of the modern public 
square, is required to examine the proportionality of the reaction (the sanction) to the user’s actions (users’ 
misbehavior). This means that this passing of compliance monitoring functions on  digital operators has a 
transaction cost for them. This also means that this implementation system can be flawed in many ways – 
maybe just because the scope of the obligations may be difficult to ascertain, because there may be 
conflicting obligations (eg with different jurisdictions claiming the right to regulate some actions) or because 
the operators decide to be over-inclusive in their systems in order to avoid their own liability.  
In the third category of sanctions (“self-regulation”), digital operators develop their own ordering and 
discipline: they may decide which actions and behaviors are allowed on digital platforms, banning other 
actions as undesirable.58 Digital operators have here a wide scope to exercise a two-prong proportionality 
test, with regards first the principle of interference and secondly the modalities of the sanction.  
At the level of principle, digital operators, acting in their capacity of warden on the modern public square,59 
decide what the code of conduct and the social norms on the platforms are. They police behavior so as to 
ensure a specific ethos on the modern public square. An illustration of this kind of self-regulation is the 
decision taken by Facebook to ban nudes on pictures.60 Here, digital operators develop their own sovereign 
spheres of power: they decide the norms that have to be complied with, the ways in which they want to 
monitor compliance and their enforcement. This may all seem to be the case of private operators exercising 
private powers under contractual agreement. Yet, platform power imbalance means users become part of 
the contractual ordering through adhesion, which is more like a social organization where the rules of the 
games have the power to include and exclude users, and which may discipline the membership against their 
will. In that case, the essence of this process seems to be close to that of a sovereign’s authority, not based 
on the freedom of will core to private entities. In addition, the policing of the platform is deemed, under 
economic theories, to be done “in the public interest”, as to attract as many users as it can.61 The organ 
may be private in its legal form, but the very essence of the relationship is public.62 In this warden function, 
digital operators may be in a position to apply the internet balancing formula to its fullest extent (taking 
into accounts all the caveat discussed in Section 4.1).  
At the level of modalities, platform operators select the most appropriate sanction amongst a large scale of 
possible options following the proportionality test, on the same model as already developed in the 
discussion on the second category of sanctions.  
In the fourth category of sanctions, digital operators do not act on their own initiative or on behalf of public 
bodies: they act as judges in adjudicating disputes between users on the platforms. Operators then develop 
dispute resolution procedures which may take a range of modalities, some being mostly automated, some 
                                                        
58 L Belli and J Venturini, « Private Ordering and the Rise of Terms of Service as Cyber-Regulation » (2016) 5:4 Internet 
Policy Review 1-17. 
59 See above Section 2.1. 
60 Facebook Community Standards, ‘12. Violence and Graphic Content’ 
<https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/graphic_violence>; see also Facebook Community Standards, 
’13. Violence and graphic content’ <https://perma.cc/KZ39-CZUA> both sources accessed 22 July 2019. 
61 Przemyslaw J Palka, « Terms of Service are not Contracts — Beyond Contract Law in the Regulation of Online 
Platforms » in S Grundmann (ed) European Contract Law in the Digital Age, vol 3 (European Contract Law in the Digital 
Age, Intersentia 2018) 136–61. Add E Marique and Y Marique, « Sanctions on digital platforms – beyond the 
public/private divide », (2019) 8:2 Cambridge Journal of International Law (forthcoming). Even platforms identifying a 
niche (such as hate-propagating platforms such as 4chan and 8chan) try to increase the number users within the 
defined niche, eliminating or decreasing the reasons for users to access competitor websites.  
62 E Marique and Y Marique, « Beyond the Public and Private Divide on Digital Platforms? Revisiting Power 
Relationships » in E Bani, E Rutkowska-Tomaszewska and B Pachuca-Smulska (eds), Public Law and the Challenges of 
New Technologies and Digital Markets (CH Beck 2019 forthcoming). 
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relying on human judgment.63 They need to design a system able to cope with a large number of issues and 
yet give users confidence that it is impartial / not too much biased. As the dispute is of a private nature 
(between two users), the adjudicating platform has little leeway to examine proportionality because the 
dispute is in the hand of the parties and respond to framework of relationships under private law, which 
solve most issues. If any difficulties arise, the proportionality test may be used as a default option, would  
one of the three first sets of circumstances described above emerge.  
5. PLUGGING GAPS IN THE PROPORTIONALITY TEST: TOWARDS MORE SUBSIDIARITY?  
The previous sections point that digital operators may use the proportionality test in a series of cases when 
they police undesirable behaviours in the modern public square; yet, there reactions (or lack of reactions) 
have to be called to account. Here, we see that the proportionality test calls for some kind a justificatory 
structure to be developed. Such accountability may be grounded in a subsidiarity principle for borderline 
cases. This section explores institutional mechanisms to support such an accountability. On the one hand, 
this paper suggests that judicial control should complement the application of the proportionality test by 
digital platforms (5.1). On the other hand, epistemic communities should develop the argumentative 
framework to adapt it to the necessities of the evolution of digital operators’ business models (5.2). 
5.1 Proportionality test in reviewing sanctions  
 
Digital platforms sanctioning process can go wrong. From abusive content removal to the lack of removal 
of hate speech through the undue automatic imposition of penalties64 or fines65, the sanctioning process is 
subject to errors and mistakes. Users who feel betrayed by the digital operators, suffer losses or want to 
obtain a remedy against these decisions could consider several legal avenues: breach of contract and 
extracontractual liability are at the core of the discussions. Contractual claims are often unfit to respond to 
user’s need because of the large discretion attributed to platform operators in the terms of use. 
Extracontractual claim raise similarly issues in terms of legal base for establishing a ground of liability. 
Because of the cost and the inappropriate character of these responses, other options need to be reviewed. 
Self-regulatory industry-wide review bodies have been considered,66 but they have been found to be failing, 
so that they cannot not be relied on too heavily.67 Facing the hurdles of these three first avenues, this paper 
proposes to consider independent review procedures for decisions undertaken by digital platforms on the 
model of what happens in administrative law, a legal field that developed techniques to control power. In 
particular, the Global Administrative Law scholarship recognizes that private bodies carrying out regulatory 
functions at a transnational level should be submitted to control similar to these existing in administrative 
law. Indeed, “due to the lack of international public institutions, they often have great[..] power and importance”.68  
 
Independent review should thus take place, to control digital operators’ decision, and if needed to 
overturn/quash them and grant adequate compensation to users. This idea could, at first sight, seem far-
                                                        
63 See C Rule, « Designing a Global Online Dispute Resolution System: Lessons Learned from eBay»  (2017) 13:2 U 
St Thomas LJ 354–364. Compare with Aide Youtube, « Qu'est-ce Qu'une Revendication Content ID? »  
<https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6013276> (FR) accessed 22 July 2019. 
64 Eg financial gains from a video posted can be reoriented to other users, despite the video amounting to original 
content. 
65 Eg penalties for misbehaving during a ride-sharing, for instance dirtying the car typically include the cost of cleaning 
the car but also a compensation for the driver who will not be able to take passengers during the time of cleaning as 
well as some incentive to prevent this behavior to take place again in the future.  
66 Eg Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, 6 April 2018, Human Rights Council, 38th session, at 58.  
67 See eg https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/second-monthly-intermediate-results-eu-code-practice-
against-disinformation; https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/fourth-intermediate-results-eu-code-
practice-against-disinformation. See also T Schulz, « Does Online Dispute Resolution Need Governmental 
Intervention? The Case for Architectures of Control and Trust » (2004) 6:1 North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology 
71-106. 
68 B Kingsbury, N Krisch and R B Stewart, « The Emergence of Global Administrative Law » (2005) 68 Law and 
Contemp Probs 15, 23. Add D Oliver, Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999) also advocated controlling private powers on the model of controls existing for public powers. 
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fetched. However, in practice, such administrative review already exists. Public authorities already review 
and sanction companies (mis)behaviors. This control goes indeed together with all the rights and duties 
attached to decision-making by public authorities. Data protection agencies can receive complaint with 
regards to inappropriate data practice in relation to users’ data or inadequate privacy policies69; competition 
law authorities can review business decisions; the English CMA can receive consumers’ complaints on 
platform handling of users;70 in the United States, the FCC also has similar powers.71 As it stands, thus, this 
administrative review is not centralized, either in term of territorial-jurisdiction or in term of substance-
matter. It is diffuse across a number of review bodies. 
 
While judicial review under contractual standard may amount to a strict interpretation of the (breached) 
duties, extracontractual and administrative reviews are about controlling the powers and the abuses of 
platforms in their decision making. Additionally, while contractual and extracontractual claims do not have 
a recognized standard of proportionality review, judicial review of power has developed techniques to carry 
out a proportionality test. Indeed, amongst other principles applicable to such organizations, such as 
participation, transparency and reasoned decisions, the Global Administrative Law establishes the necessity 
for independent or judicial review. Standards considered include the respect for legitimate expectations, 
means-end rationality, avoidance of unnecessarily restrictive means but also significantly proportionality.72 
It is therefore possible that, in practice and subject to peculiarities of domestic legal systems, digital 
operators’ power could be included in the existing administrative review process.  
 
In practice, the independent reviewer needs to assess whether the principles of interference, the principle 
of a sanction and its casuistic modalities is proportional will be the usual proportionality test, as currently 
developed in the legal scholarship. While Susi’s formula would constitute an element to be considered, 
parties could advance a series of other arguments. If this proposal of independent review becomes ever 
part of positive law at a large scale/global level, this new set of case-law will also have to be integrated in 
the platform operators decision-making process. This will hopefully feed a virtuous loop in order to 
improve the proportionality test for a modern public square.  
 
5.2 Proportionality test in epistemic communities  
 
While the paper has outlined the assessment of proportionality in a modern public square by lawmakers, 
digital operators and independent reviewers, this principle needs to evolve and be discussed in order to 
ensure its evolution and uniform use. Epistemic communities should develop around the argumentative 
framework to adapt the proportionality to the necessities of the evolution of digital operators’ business 
models.73 As already pointed in Section 5.1, only key users will be equipped with the skills, knowledge, data 
and tools to operate the formula.  
 
Therefore, to ensure full accountability of digital platform operators, and of their users, a community of 
“proportionalists” need to emerge. Such community would establish regular, public forums where data 
available on the (1) forms of interferences and behaviors prohibited, (2) modalities of sanctions, (3) 
complaints by users and (4) the result of the review process would be shared by the different actors. 
Interpretation of these results would be subject to discussions, as well as means to improve the existing 
assessment.  
 
Publicity of these discussions is absolutely necessary. Indeed, the proportionality test as currently framed 
lack an important component: the public interest factor. While the exclusion for “historic truth” amounts 
                                                        
69 See eg in France, Commission national de l’informatique et des libertés Délibération n°SAN-2018-011 du 19 
décembre 2018 prononçant une sanction pécuniaire à l’encontre de la société Uber France SAS (available on the 
official website : legifrance).  
70 See eg https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-travel-agents-monitoring-of-pricing-practices . 
71 See eg https://consumercomplaints.fcc.gov/hc/en-us . 
72 B Kingsbury, N Krisch and R B Stewart, « The Emergence of Global Administrative Law » (2005) 68 Law and 
Contemp Probs 15 at 38-41.  
73 S Quack, « Expertise and authority in transnational governance » in R Cotterrell and M del Mar (eds), Authority in 
Transnational Legal Theory – Theorising Across Disciplines (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2016) 361-386. 
 17 
to one form of public interest, the assessment as proposed under the Internet balancing formula is an 
individualist approach, with little space for collective, social and cultural rights. This leads to asking the 
question whether one needs to understand conflicts on platforms from the perspective of balancing rights, 
freedoms and interests at the level of the beneficiaries (adopting then a subjective approach) or of balancing 
norms at the point of their sources and authors (adopting then a more objective approach). The 
contribution of a pluralistic approach may be to accept that these two approaches do not exclude each 
other automatically, but that a method to coordinate them (at an aggregate level) may offer a way forward. 
Indeed, power on individuals stands at the interface between these two questions.  
 
In addition, publicity is required to go against the private ordering powers that platform operators enjoy 
and would limit their discretion, facilitate the functioning of a modern public square, akin to an assembly 
where groups in their diversity/pluralism can be express their opinions and be heard.  
 
Last but not least, such discussion would ensure the credibility of the proportionality assessment, and its 
openness to criticism and feedback. The methodology could therefore be refined after discussions with 
NGOs as well as with professional organizations (eg ethics boards for web developers74). The discussions 
would also be an opportunity to educate users and make them learn discursivity and alterity, and to accept 
differences.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper asked how digital operators could manage colliding rights on the modern public square. 
Suggesting that digital operators have special duties to maintain the integrity and social order as warden of 
this modern public square, this paper argues that reactions from digital operators towards undesirable 
behaviours threatening the  proper functioning of the community can be labelled as “sanctions”. In 
choosing the principles and the modalities of their reactions, digital operators may rely on a proportionality 
test when exercising their discretion. 
 
So in the case of 4chan, the digital operators ruled out harassment, hate speech and similar in order to 
protect users and third parties. Their banning of some abusive behaviours constitutes a reaction showing 
the core priorities to the platform, ie a strict commitment to comply with the legal framework and to avoid 
any legal liability. As a by effect, this reaction restored social peace within the community of users. In 
reaction to this limitation in free speech, a break way group left 4chan to set up 8chan. 8chan’s policy was 
to guarantee freedom of expression as radically as possible. This led eventually to the platform shutdown. 
These illustrations are extreme: the proportionality test has been exercised in neither cases. However, they 
show the possible scope and opportunities for a proportionality test. In order to avoid situations as critical, 
digital operators have interests to adopt moderating techniques, ie to balance colliding values and rights 
with a proportionality test. However, the long-term sustainability of such a strategy relies on developing a 
relevant and shared justificatory framework.  
Digital platforms should indeed be accountable for their reactions to undesirable behaviours and for 
breaching their commitments. However, they should keep a certain level of discretion in exercising their 
warden functions on the modern public square. This rather liberal approach does not exclude that the 
functioning of the proportionality test to assess sanctions generates ethical behavioural norms for fostering 
diversity and integrity in the modern public square.  
Overall, the use of the proportionality test to assess sanctions on the modern public square should benefit 
from further analysis into its contribution to the rule of law and to discussions into issues related to global 
justice on the modern public square. 
                                                        
74 I Sample, « Maths and tech specialists need Hippocratic oath, says academic » The Guardian, London, 16 August 
2019 (available at https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/aug/16/mathematicians-need-doctor-style-
hippocratic-oath-says-academic-hannah-fry). 
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